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innocence, however, certainly appeals more to the conception of
justice than conviction of one who lies with a youthful temptress.
The Florida statute and its interpretations form a fair compromise
covering the void left in the common law of rape.
JOSEPH F. McDERMOTr

OPTIONS AND THE RULE AGAINST PERPETUITIES
THE MARRIAGE

The use of options has become widespread in the business world.
Much land speculation is undertaken with options to purchase in a
stranger - herein referred to as "in gross"; shopping centers give to
their lessees options to renew - herein referred to as "appendant to
renew"; business property lessees insist upon options to purchase herein referred to as "appendant to purchase." The stock option is a
favorite form of corporate executive compensation. Businessmen employ the various option devices for the purpose of reaping profits
from property that otherwise might remain unproductive, unprofitable, and in many cases unalienable. Public policy demands that
businessmen be allowed to use long-term options.
The favored child of the law of future interests was conceived in
1681 in The Duke of Norfolk's Case.' Gestation lingered until 1833,
however, when in Cadell v. Palmer2 there was born what is known
today as the Rule Against Perpetuities. 3 On the Rule's forty-ninth
birthday it was coupled with the option in the landmark case of
London & South Western Ry. v. Gomm. 4 It is submitted that the
13 Ch. Cas. 1, 22 Eng. Rep. 931 (1681).
210 Bing. 140, 131 Eng. Rep. 859 (H.L. 1833).

3Florida recognizes the common law Rule Against Perpetuities. In Story v.
First Nat'l Bank & Trust Co., 115 Fla. 436, 156 So. 101 (1934), the Court said:
"[Tjhe vesting of an estate . . . can be postponed no longer than a life or lives
in being and twenty-one years plus the period of gestation." The generally accepted statement of the Rule, as stated by Gray, is as follows: "No interest is
good unless it must vest, if at all, not later than twenty-one years after some
life in being at the creation of the interest." GRAY, THE RULE AGAINST PERPETUITIES §201 (4th ed. 1942).
420 Ch. D. 562 (1882).
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Rule Against Perpetuities should not have trespassed into the mercurial world of commerce, where options are commonplace. The
Rule should have been permitted to tread only in its original environment- the world of estates and trusts.
It is the design of this note to present the possibility of a divorce
of the Rule Against Perpetuities from all options in certain jurisdictions, to reconcile the differing American decisions, and to indicate
the possible effect of a substitution of appraisal price for fixed price
in the option contract.
THE DIvoRCE

The jurisdictions that have divorced options from the Rule Against
Perpetuities have done so on one of the following grounds: (1) an
option creates no interest in land;5 (2) an option creates a vested
interest in land; 6 (3) an option is personal;7 (4) an option is an
exception to the Rule Against Perpetuities.8
The Rule Against Perpetuities is a rule of property law, not of
contract law. Options, therefore, can be affected only to the extent
that they create an interest in property. In option contracts in which
the Rule Against Perpetuities is not in issue, the courts generally
have held that an unexercised option creates no interest in the
property. A striking example of this occured in Gautier v. Lapof.
The Florida Supreme Court stated: 9
"It seems clear to us that until an optionee exercises a
right to purchase in accordance with the terms of his option
he has no estate, either legal or equitable, in the lands involved ....
"Nor do we know of any rule or reason which would cause
a different result.. .. "
In cases not dealing with the Rule Against Perpetuities, only two
jurisdictions have held that an unexercised option gives the optionee
Keogh v. Peck, 316 Ill. 318, 147 N.E. 266 (1925).
GBirmingham Canal Co. v. Cartwright, 11 Ch. D. 421 (1879).
7Dodd v. Rotterman, 330 Ill. 362, 161 N.E. 756 (1928); Weitzmann v. Weitzmann, 87 Ind. App. 236, 161 N.E. 385 (1928).
8Dozier v. Troy Drive-in-Theaters, Inc., 265 Ala. 93, 89 So.2d 537 (1956); Hollander v. Central Metal & Supply Co., 109 Md. 131, 71 Atl. 442 (1908).
191 So.2d 324, 326 (Fla. 1956).
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any interest in the property.10 American courts, with few exceptions,
however, have held that the Rule Against Perpetuities applies to
options by disregarding the issue of interest in land. 1' It is submitted
that the jurisdictions that have not passed upon the question have a
sound basis for granting this so-called divorce of the Rule Against
Perpetuities from options by squarely facing the issue and holding
that no interest in land is created by an option.
Jurisdictions that insist upon finding an interest in land can hold
the interest to be vested, 1 2 thus circumventing the Rule Against
Perpetuities. Although the only decision to employ such reasoning
was later overruled,13 the possibility of such a rationale should still
be considered.
Notwithstanding the fact that the concept of a contingent interest
is established, the Rule Against Perpetuities can be avoided by labeling
the option personal. If a personal element is required of either party
to an option, that party will be the life in being 4 and the Rule
Against Perpetuities cannot be violated.' 5
The fourth and most direct method of divorcing options from the
Rule Against Perpetuities is by simply holding that the option is an
exception to the rule.16 In America only West Virginia has decided
that an option appendant to purchase was invalidated by the Rule
Against Perpetuities.1 A recent West Virginia statute, ' , however, has
declared the option appendant to purchase an exception to the Rule.
It is submitted that every American jurisdiction will find it commercially expedient to declare the option appendant to purchase at a
fixed price' an exception to the Rule Against Perpetuities, either
judicially or legislatively. In addition to options appendant to purl0Kerr v. Day, 14 Pa. 112 (1850); Wall v. Minneapolis, St. P. & S.S.M. Ry., 86
Wis. 48, 56 N.W. 367 (1893).
GRAY, THE RULE AGAINST PERPETUITIES §330 (4th ed. 1942).
"2Birmingham Canal Co. v. Cartwright, 11 Ch. D. 421 (1879).

"1See

"3London and South Western Ry. v. Gomm, 20 Ch. D. 562 (1882).
'4Frissell v. Nichols, 94 Fla. 403, 114 So. 431 (1927). This case was not concerned with the Rule Against Perpetuities; however, it gives Florida's position on
what kind of contract is personal.
'5Cases cited note 7 supra.
-OCases cited note 8 supra.
";First Huntington Nat'l Bank v. Gideon-Broh Realty Co., 139 W. Va. 130, 79
S.E.2d 675 (1953).
'sW. VA. CODE ch. 36, art. 1, §24 (Michie Supp. 1960).
'5 See text accompanying note 30 infra for the effect of the inclusion of appraisal or market price in the option appendant contract.
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chase, "it is well settled that perpetual options to renew leases have
20
always been held valid."
RECONCILING THE AMERICAN DECISIONS

The purposes behind the Rule Against Perpetuities have been
stated to be (1) to prohibit remoteness of vesting,2' (2) to prohibit
restraint on alienation,22 and (3) to prohibit restraint on improve-

ments.23 Undoubtedly there are special instances in which any one of
the three purposes would be applicable, but it is submitted that only
one is pertinent when referring to options - the prohibition against
restraint on improvements.
It is impossible to reconcile the American views on options by
using the definition of the Rule as one against restraint on alienation.
2
Gulliver asserts: 1
"The rule against suspension of the power of alienation
proceeds on the theory that the rule against perpetuities is only
violated by an interest that may remain legally unassignable
after the expiration of the period of the rule. Under this
theory, an interest, even if it may remain contingent beyond
the period, will not violate the rule if it is certain to be assignable before the period expires. An interest capable of being
released is assignable for this purpose."
In the option contract there is no legal impediment to conversion
of the various interests into absolute ownership, and for that reason
the theory of restraint of alienation will not invalidate the option.
There are still many practical obstacles to conversion, however. Gulliver states further: "The rule against remoteness of vesting favored
by Gray . . . is the generally accepted theory in the United States

today." 25 The purposes behind the rule against remoteness are to cur25See Leach, Perpetuities in a Nutshell, 51 HARV. L. REv. 638, 662 (1938).
21GRAY, THE RULE AGAINST PERPETUITIES §205 (4th ed. 1942).'

22Berg, Long-term Options and the Rule Against Perpetuities, 37 CALIF. L. REV.
1,2 (1949).
2sWing v. Arnold, 107 So.2d 765 (3d D.C.A. Fla. 1958).
24GULL VER, Fur uR IN ERmiss 79 (1959). Professor Gulliver also points out that
the theory of the rule against suspension of the power of alienation has been
generally discarded today.
25GULLIVER, FUTURE INTERESTS 80 (1959).
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tail dead hand domination and to facilitate marketability. There is
no more dead hand control or restraint on marketability of property
subject to an option than there would be of property encumbered
by an easement. In the latter instance the heirs of the owner must
join with the holder of the easement in order to alienate the unencumbered property. In the option situation it would be possible to
alienate the unencumbered property without joining with others,
because the purchaser need deal only with the optionee. What if the
optionee does not want to sell? The optionor's heirs can convey his
land subject to the option, just as the owner of a servient estate can
transfer his property subject to an easement.
A Florida district court of appeal has raised the only view whereby
the American decisions on options in gross and appendant can rationally be reconciled: it has held that the Rule Against Perpetuities is a
rule against restraint on improvements.26 Various option situations
will now be examined to see whether the party in possession will be
restrained from making improvements.
An option in gross for a fixed price would certainly discourage
the optionor-possessor from improving his land, because if he did
so the optionor would not be repaid for the value of the improvements should the optionee exercise the option. Therefore, it should
be held void. An option appendant to purchase at a fixed price or an
option to renew would increase the chances of improvements, because
improvements made by the optionee-possessor would inure to him
at no amplification in price upon exercise of the option. Therefore,
it should be held valid. Looking in retrospect at the American decisions, it is noted that the American view is in accord with these
conclusions. This is a strong indication that restraint on improvements is the theory that the American courts have unconsciously been
2
following. Professor Leach recognizes this theory, pointing out:

7

"An option in gross is an effective preventative of the improvement of the land over which it exists unless (as is rarely,
if ever, the case) the purchase price under the option fluctuates in accordance with the improved value of the land. As
long as the option lasts the owner in possession cannot afford
to make improvements which can be snatched away from him
without compensation by the exercise of the option."
26Wing v. Arnold, 107 So.2d 765 (3d D.C.A. Fla. 1958).
27Leach, supra note 20, at 661.
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EFFECT oF ThE APPRAISAL PRICE

A logical extension of the improvement theory is to draw a distinction between fixed price options and appraisal or market price
options, because they have opposite effects upon restraint on improvements. The substitution of appraisal or market price for fixed price
in the option contract should lead to a different conclusion as to the
validity of the option. In two recent cases, however, the courts failed
to recognize this distinction.
The Supreme Court of Errors of Connecticut in Neustadt v.
Pearce2s held that an option in gross to purchase at market price was
invalid, saying simply, "This distinction is superficial and is not a
valid one." However, Professor Leach, in discussing the improvement
theory, has implied in a fact situation similar to the one presented to
the Connecticut court that an opposite result is preferable, because
improvements by the optionor would enhance the value of the prop29
erty and would be reflected in an augmented purchase price.
A Florida district court of appeal held valid an option appendant
to purchase in a 99-year lease at a price to be determined by appraisal,
30
stating in part:
"The reasoning given to the majority view is that improvement of the land is stimulated rather than retarded by the
presence of an option to purchase in the lessee, and substantial
improvements may be made by the lessee with impunity. Without the benefit of such an option it would not be good business
for a lessee to make improvements which would have substantial
value at the end of the lease term. .. ."
This quotation illustrates the reason why courts in the United States
should hold an option appendant to purchase at a fixed price valid.
Such an option does not violate the policy behind the Rule Against
Perpetuities. The Florida court failed to note the peculiarity in the
particular case, however, in that the purchase price was not fixed but
was to be determined by appraisal at the time the option was to be
exercised. It is submitted that the addition of the appraisal price
could make the option appendant subject to the same limitation that
28145 Conn. 403, 143 A.2d 437, 438 (1958).
29Leach, supra note 20.

soWing v. Arnold, 107 So.2d 765, 769 (3d D.C.A. Fla. 1958).
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has resulted in invalidating options in gross to purchase at a fixed
price. As previously pointed out, in the latter case the optionorpossessor will be restrained from making improvements, since any
addition to the value of the land will not enhance the selling price.
Similarly, in an option appendant to purchase at appraisal price, the
optionee-lessee-possessor will not improve the leasehold until he exercises the option; any improvements made will increase the price that
he will have to pay when he chooses to buy. It would indeed be a
harsh rule that would invalidate an option in gross and condone
precisely the same limitation in an option appendant with price to
be determined by appraisal.
CONCLUSION

American jurisdictions today will uniformly protect the option
appendant to purchase and the option appendant to renew from the
Rule Against Perpetuities. It is doubtful that the courts will use the
"appraisal or market price" distinction to hold the options appendant
invalid when these factual situations arise. In the absence of legislation, future litigation will be concentrated in the option in gross
area. Possibly the "appraisal or market price" distinction may be the
basis upon which the courts will formulate decisions holding the option in gross valid. However, until the courts accept this distinction,
the attorney, to be sure of avoiding the effect of the Rule Against Perpetuities, must draw the long-term option contract so that it is either
manifestly a personal contract or necessarily exercised within the
period deemed proper under the Rule Against Perpetuities.
The truism "wedlock is padlock" is seemingly quite apropos to
the marriage of the Rule Against Perpetuities and options. It has
been the purpose of this note to present some of the possible combinations for unlocking this union.
GEORGE T. DUNLAP III
FREDRIC

G.
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